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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
cover for a back injury in Washington. To require a showing of an
"unusual strain" as required in heart cases would place an insurmount-
able burden on workmen. 46 It is therefore submitted that the result of
the Boeing case should have been reached in the instant case. The relation-
ship of the Boeing case to the instant case is apparent. There the claimant,
a typist, suffered a back injury while bending and twisting to lift a tele-
phone.47 In the instant case claimant, a lumber stacker, sustained a back
injury while bending and twisting to lift a block of wood.48 The instant
decision, by applying the "unusual strain" test of cardiac cases, failed
to reach a reasonable result. As the Boeing case pointed out: "An un-
thinking or automatic application of the heart rule to the mechanical
structures of the body would be unreasonable, illogical, and unwise. In-
dustry must bear the expense of injuries which are caused by the appli-
cation of force to a mechanical bodily structure. '49
The major purpose of workmen's compensation is to place the bur-
den for work-injuries upon industry, rather than upon the individual
worker, or public or private charity. Such legislation does not have the
same function as commercial life insurance. It provides only that the
worker shall recover for those injuries caused by his employment. This
does not mean that the claimant should be subjected to unwarranted legal
technicalities to prevent recovery for a justified claim. The doctrine set
forth in the Murphy case, requiring liberal construction of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, should be revived.5 0 The intent of the legislature was
to restrict recovery for heart failure and disease not arising out of em-
ployment. The language of the new statute is not so restrictive as to ex-
clude back injuries sustained in the course of employment. Judicial fiat
should not impose narrow limitations upon humanitarian legislation. The
court must act affirmatively to correct this decision. The spirit of work-
men's compensation will be lost if future Montana claimants are bound
by the holding of the instant case.
WILLIAM W. WERTZ.
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT HAS No JURISDICTION OVER A LEASE OF TRIBAL
LAND TO A NoN-INDIAN.-Petitioncrs were Canadian citizens and share-
holders in co-petitioner, the St. Marys Lake Development Corporation.
In 1962, the corporation executed a twenty five year lease' of Blackfeet
tribal land. In 1964, a member of the Blackfeet Tribe filed a complaint
and the defendant Blackfect Tribal Court ordered the petitioners to
"Ibid.
"1Id. at 146.
"Record, James v. V.K.V. Lumber, 401 P.2d 282 (1965), p.3 .
"Boeing v. Fine, supra note 42, at 147.
08Supra note 19, at 1097; R.C.M. 1947, § 92-838.
'The lease was approved by the Secretary of Interior acting through the area director.
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show cause why they should not be permanently restrained from enter-
ing the reservation. On petition for writ of prohibition 2 in federal district
court, held, denied. The federal district court had no jurisdiction over a
lease of tribal land since that was an internal matter over which the
Blackfeet Indian Tribe had exclusive jurisdiction. United States v.
Blackfeet Tribal Court, 244 F. Supp. 474 (D. Mont. 1965).
Traditionally Indian Tribes have been regarded as possessing limited
sovereign powers. As early as 1778, the Continental Congress recognized
the quasi-sovereign nature of Indian tribes by dealing with them on the
basis of treaty rather than legislative enactment.3 According to Chief
Justice Marshall, "The Indian nations had always been considered as dis-
tinct, independent, political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.
..- However, these sovereign powers were not unlimited; and by 1831,
the United States Supreme Court had made it clear that an Indian tribe'
was neither a state nor a foreign country within the meaning of the Con-
stitution.5 In 1871, Congress discontinued the use of its treaty powers
in dealing with the Indians and terminated whatever international status
the tribes had possessed.6
Despite the concept of tribal sovereignty Congress has plenary power
to regulate Indian affairs. The constitutional source of this congressional
authority emanates from the power to make war and peace,7 to make
treaties,8 and to regulate commerce.9 The actual source and scope of this
authority, however, is grounded in policy :10
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a
race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is neces-
sary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among
whom they dwell. It must exist in that government because it has
never existed anywhere else, because the theatre of its exercise is
within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has
never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all
the tribes.
In other words, governmental concern for tribal welfare has caused the
Indian to be treated as a ward of the government.1
'The All Writs Act, 63 Stat. 102 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1958), gives the federal
district courts authority to issue all writs necessary to the exercise of their jurisdic-
tion. However, it "does not operate to confer jurisdiction . . . since it may be
invoked by a district court only in aid of jurisdiction which it already has." Staf-
ford v. Superior Court of Cal. in and for County of Los Angeles, 272 F.2d 407, 409
(9th Cir. 1959).
Treaty with the Delaware Indians, 7 Stat. 13 (1778).
'Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
'Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). "They may, more cor-
rectly, perhaps be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory
to which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point
of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of
pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian. " '
616 Stat. 566 (1871), '25 U.S.C. § 71 (1958).
7U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 11.
'U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
"United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886).
"The first pronouncement of this doctrine was made in United States v. Kagama,
1966]
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As guardian of the Indians, the avowed governmental policy has been
"to make ,all Indians full-fledged participants in American society.' 12
Through legislation, Congress has sought to implement this policy by
alloting the Indian land, 1 3 by making the Indian a citizen of the United
States,14 and by improving tribal self-government. 1" Such measures as
these supercede any "soverign" tribal law to the contrary. But where
legislation does not reach, the original tribal laws and customs still gov-
ern the internal affairs of Indian tribes, although the tribe may adopt
certain federal regulations. These regulations are issued by the Secretary
of the Interior; and they become the tribal law of any tribe which chooses
to adopt them.' 6
A great many of the Indian tribes' sovereign powers remain intact.
The Indian tribe has the power to determine its own membership,"1 regu-
late its domestic relations,' 8 prescribe methods for the devolution of
property,' 9 tax both members and nonmembers on the reservation, 20 and
to set up tribal courts for the administration of justice on the reserva-
tion. 2' The instant case illustrates the impact of these sovereign powers
upon the jurisdiction of the federal district courts.
supra note 10. But see Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L.
REV. 145, 193 (1940). Cohen argues that Indians are not made wards of the govern-
ment merely because they are subject to federal jurisdiction. In the absence of a
federal statute no court would have the right to put an Indian under guardianship.
Otherwise any group bearing a special relation to the federal government, e.g. bene-
ficiaries of social security legislation, would be in danger of losing many of their
liberties.
'Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). Also see DEP'T OF THE SOLICITOR, U.S.
DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 252 (1958), quoting Commissioner Francis
E. Leupp of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, "it is our duty to set him [the Indian]
upon his feet and sever forever the ties which bind him either to his tribe, ill the
communal sense, or to the Government."
'General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1958).
'143 Stat. 253 (1924) as amended, 66 Stat. 235 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1958).
"Wheeler-Howard Act, 48 Stat. 984, 987 (1934), 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1958).
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law,
the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest in such tribe or its tribal council
the following rights and powers: To employ legal counsel, the choice of counsel and
fixing of fees to be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior; to prevent
the sale. disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other
tribal assets without the consent of the tribe; and to negotiate with the Federal, State
and local Governments."
"
5Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959).
It has been argued that the power of Congress to regulate Indian affairs renders
local powers of the Indian tribes, federal powers. The fallacy of such an argument
is the failure to recognize that tribal sovereign powers existed before there was a
federal government. Consequently federal action has a negative rather than an
affirmative affect on tribal powers. Mandatory federal legislation limits or defines
existing tribal powers. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). On the other
hand, nonmandatory federal regulations issued by the federal agencies in charge of
Indian affairs affect tribal powers only if the tribe chose to adopt such regulations.
"Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe of Southern Ute Res., 249 F.2d 915, 920 (10th Cir.
1957). "In absence of express legislation by Congress to the contrary, a tribe has
the complete authority to determine all questions of its own membership as a political
entity. ''
"25 C.F.R. § 11.27-30 (1958).
"25 C.F.R. § 11.31-32 (1958).
2wBarta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Res., 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958).
248 Stat. 987 (1934), 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1958). Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of
Pine Ridge Res., 231 F.2d 89, 96 (8th Cir. 1956). "Indian Tribal Courts have
inherent jurisdiction over all matters not taken over by tile federal government, but
[Vol. 27,
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The lower federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 22 In til
absence of a special statute, jurisdiction is dependent upon the existence
of a "federal question"23 or upon diversity of citizenship.24 A "federal
question" is raised whenever the Indian, 25 like the non-Indian, is able to
show that his controversy involves the validity, effect, or construction of
a federal law. 26 The only aspect of this type of federal jurisdiction which
has been affected by tribal sovereignty is that of Constitutional viola-
tions. Here it is not sufficient for a person to allege that the tribal gov-
ernment has violated his Constitutional rights. The courts have reasoned
that since the Indian tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over its internal
affairs, it does not exercise federal powers. Thus, the Indian tribe cannot
be bound by the Bill of Rights because it applies only to the actions of the
federal governmentY.2  Nor is the Fourteenth Amendment any limitation
on the Indian tribe's actions, since an Indian tribe is not a state within
the meaning of that Amendment. 28 And even if these barriers could be
overcome, there still remains tribal immunity from suit.
2 9
Tribal sovereignty has also affected the diversity of citizenship con-
cept. After the Indians were made citizens of the United States and of
the states where they resided, it was possible for an Indian to meet the
diversity test of the federal courts.3 0 However, difficulty is created by
the requirement that federal courts in diversity cases act as adjuncts to
the state courts.3 1 As a limitation on jurisdiction, this means that when
that federal legislative action and rules promulgated thereunder support the authority
of the Tribal Courts.''
'Garroutte v. General Motors Corp., 179 F. Supp. 315 (D. Ark. 1959).
136 Stat. 1091 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958). See Landon, "Federal Question"
Jurisdiction-A Snare and a Delusion, 57 MicH. L. REV. 835 (1958-1959), for a
critical examination of "federal question" jurisdiction.
2136 Stat. 1091 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958).
'Although Indians are considered wards of the government, the mere fact that an
individual Indian or tribe is a party is not sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction
Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, supra note 17.
2Supra note 23. This jurisdictional requirement is not met by showing that the con-
tested right originates in federal law, since, "the federal nature of the right to be
established is decisive." Puerto Rico v. Russell and Co., 288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933).
The test is whether the plaintiff's claim "involves a dispute or controversy respecting
the validity, construction or effect of such a law . . . . ' Shulthis v. McDougal,
225 U.S. 561, 569 (1911). Compare American Well Works Co. v. Layne and Bowler
Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1915): "A suit arises under the law that creates the cause
of action.''
"See Talton v. Mayes, supra note 16, where a tribal statute providing for a five man
grand jury was held not to violate the Fifth Amendment and Native American Church
v. Navajo Tribal Council, supra note 16, where tribal council interference with
Indian's freedom of religion was held not to violate the First Amendment.
Apparently only the Thirteenth Amendment applies to Indian Tribes. Compare
In re Sah Quah, 31 Fed. 327 (D. Alaska 1886) with Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d
369 (9th Cir. 1965) which concluded that a federal district court had jurisdiciton to
issue a writ of habeas corpus to release an Indian incarcerated by a tribal court.
The case is analyzed in 26 MONT. L. REV. 235 (1965).
'Toledo v. Pueblo De Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D. N.M. 1954).
'Dicke v. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes Inc., 304 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1962). The sover-
eign immunity of an Indian tribe is similar to that of the United States government.
The tribe can be sued by neither Indian nor non-Indian unless consent has been
obtained.
"'Supra note 14.
'Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1966]
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"one is barred from recovery in the state court, he should likewise be
barred in the federal court. '32 Since state law, like federal law, is not
applicable to those matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe,33
diversity jurisdiction cannot be invoked when the contested matter in-
volves internal tribal affairs. 3 4
These limitations on federal jurisdiction were extended further by
the instant case. The court not only recognized the existence of tribal
sovereignty over tribal affairs, but also concluded that Indian tribes in
the exercise of these powers had exclusive jurisdiction over non-Indians.
In other words, civil causes of actions arising on the reservation between
Indians or tribes and non-Indians could not be within the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. To reach this conclusion, the court relied heavily on
Littell v. Nakai.35
In the Littell case, federal jurisdiction over a contract between an
Indian and a non-Indian was denied on the ground that it was within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribal Court. The basis of tribal
jurisdiction over the non-Indian was said to be "implicit"36 in the Navajo
Treaty of 1868.' 7 The court reasoned that the treaty, by making the
reservation the Indians' home and by excluding non-Indians from it,
recognized in the Navajo Tribe the exclusive right to govern all activities
on the reservation. Moreover, since Congress had not chosen to limit
these tribal rights, the Navajo tribal government was vested with ex-
clusive responsibility for its internal affairs. Consequently the non-
Indian in his dealings with the Indian could look only to the Navajo
tribal courts. Neither the state nor the federal courts had the power to
interfere with tribal authority.
An examination of the Navajo Treaty does not support this analysis.
Article I expressly retains jurisdiction in the United States over all
wrongs committed by non-Indians against th person or property of In-
uWoods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949).
83Williams v. Lee, supra note 12.
5 Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied 86 Sup. Ct. 331
(1966). This raises a question of whether the federal courts could apply tribal law
in diversity cases. If this were done, then the integrity of the tribal law could be
maintained, while at the same time making it feasible to invoke diversity jurisdiction
in this area. However, the author has not discovered any case raising this issue.
35Instant case at pp. 477-78. In turn Littell, supra note 34, at 488, relied on Williams
v. Lee, supra note 12, at 221. In that case, the plaintiff, a non-Indian, operated a
store on the Navajo Reservation. When two Indians refused to pay for goods, the
plaintiff brought action in an Arizona state court. After the Supreme Court of
Arizona affirmed judgment for the plaintiff, the United States Supreme Court held
the state court had no jurisdiction. The Supreme Court after reviewing the history
of the Navajo Tribe concluded:
In return for their promises to keep peace, this treaty "set apart" for "their perma-
nent home" a portion of what had been their native country, and provided that no
one, except United States Government personnel, was to enter the reserved area.
Implicit in these treaty terms, as it was in the treaties with the Cherokees involved
in Worcester v. Georgia [supra note 4], was the understanding that the internal affairs
of the Indians remained exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal govern-
ment existed.
"Littell v. Nakai, supra note 34, at 488.
"15 Stat. 667 (1868).
[Vol. 27,
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dians.35 Article II permits only agents and officers of the United States
Government to enter the reservation.3 9 These provisions tend to show
that the United States did limit tribal sovereignty over non-Indians. The
non-Indian was not only prohibited from entering tribal lands, but in
the event he did, his wrongful acts were subject to the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Since the court in the instant case assumed the Blackfeet 4
and Navajo Treaties were substantially the same,41 it would appear that
the basis for the decisions in both the Littell and instant cases was ques-
tionable.
Although it is arguable that the treaty has been misinterpreted by the
court, the Indian tribes do possess all those sovereign powers which Con-
gress has not expressly denied.42 Consequently original tribal powers
would have subjected all non-Indians on the reservation to tribal juris-
diction. The question, then, is whether either the Blackfeet or Navajo
Treaty expressly deprived the tribes of their sovereign powers over non-
Indians.
The treaties do not provide a ready answer. It is not clear whether
Article I applies only to crimes against Indians or whether it also includes
civil wrongs against Indians.43 Since any doubt in the construction of an
Indian treaty is to be resolved in favor of the tribe,44 it may be assumed
that the treaties left intact the original tribal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. Nevertheless, this interpretation did not require the results
obtained in either the instant case or the Littell case.
Both Blackfeet and Navajo Tribes have adopted the "Law and
Order Code" promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior.45 The pre-
amble to the Code provides: "It is the purpose of the regulations in this
parl to provide adequate machinery of law enforcement for those Indian
trites in which traditional agencies for the enforcement of tribal law and
custom have broken down for which no adequate substitute has been
provided under Federal or State law."'46
38Ibid.
If bad men among the whites, or among other people subject to the authority of
the United States, shall commit any wrong upon the person or property of the Indians,
the United States will. upon proof made to the agent and forwarded to the Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs at Washington City, proceed at once to cause the offender
to be arrested and punished according to the laws of the United States, and also to
reimburse the injured persons for the loss sustained.
1ld. at 668.
This reservation . . . is hereby, set apart for the use and occupation of the Navajo
tribe of Indians, and for such other friendly tribes or individual Indians as from time
to time they may -be willing, with the consent of the United States, to admit among
them; and the United States agrees that no person except those herein so authorized
to do, and except such officers, soldiers, agents, and employes of the government,
or of the Indians, as may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations, in discharge
of duties imposed by law, or the orders of the President. shall ever be permitted to pass
over, settle upon, or reside in, the territory described in this article.
'Treaty with the Sioux Indians (including the Blackfeet Tribe), 15 Stat. 635 (1869).
"Instant case at 478.
'"Talton v. Mayes, supra note 16.
"There has apparently been no interpretation of this section. The confusion arises
from the use of the words "wrong" and "reimburse.'' Supra note 38. Wrongs
against persons and property generally refers to criminal action. However, "reim-
bursement'' implies damages.
"Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
"Instant case at 478; Williams v. Lee, supra note 12, at 255.
-25 C.F.R. § 11.1(b) (1958).
1966]
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This provision indicates a governmental concern for the traditional
tribal judicial systems, by offering a federally approved substitute. This
substitute expressly limits the civil jurisdiction of the Indian tribes over
non-Indians: "The Courts of Indian Offenses shall have jurisdiction of
all suits wherein the defendant is a member of the tribe or tribes within
their jurisdiction, and of all other suits between members and nonmem-
bers which are brought before the courts by stipulation of both parties.
47
Under a literal construction of this provision, neither the Blackfeet nor
the Navajo tribal courts should have had jurisdiction over the petitioners,
since there was no showing that the petitioners submitted to this jurisdic-
tion.
48
These provisions are not mandatory, but once they are adopted by
the Indian tribes, they are considered tribal law.49 Therefore by adopting
a regulation expressly limiting tribal jurisdiction, the tribes relinquished
certain of their sovereign powers. Although a non-Indian may not be
able to enforce this relinquishment against the tribe, still it has important
implications for federal court jurisdiction. The federal courts could no
longer say that tribal sovereignty barred jurisdiction, since the tribes
by voluntarily limiting their jurisdiction over the non-Indian, have indi-
cated a willingness to abdicate their exclusive jurisdiction. Consequently,
it could be argued that this abdication, at the very least, gave the federal
courts concurrent jurisdiction.50
Nonetheless, it is recognized that the court in the instant case was not
facing an easy problem. It was confronted with the concept of inherent
sovereign powers. Whatever the meaning of that concept, it is clear that
it would include a lease of tribal land. Moreover, any distinction the
court might have made between an Indian lessee and a non-Indian lessee
was precluded by the Littell case. Thus, the result of the instant case is
not at all surprising.
However, it is submitted that a more realistic approach is needed in
the area of Indian law. The vague concept of tribal sovereignty should
not preclude a federal court from examining into the merits of any con-
troversy between an Indian and a non-Indian. To affirm the propositions
set forth in the Littell and instant cases would have the effect of forcing
'125 C.F.R. § 11.22 (1958).
'In the instant case only one of the petitioners was served with process by the Black-
feet Tribal Court. However, both appeared specially and objected to its jurisdiction.
"Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, supra note 16.
'Another possible approach to this problem is illustrated by Colliflower v. Garland,
supra note 27, at 379. In that case a Fort Belknap Indian, after being incarcerated
by the tribal authorities, was able to obtain a writ of habeas corpus in a federal
district court. The Ninth Circuit held that because of extensive federal control over
the Fort Belknap tribal government, the tribal courts "function in part as a federal
agency and in part as a tribal agency". Consequently it was competent to inquire
into the tribal activities by writ of habeas corpus. Quare: Does this mean that
Indians are now to be accorded complete constitutional protection; and if so, will
this result in requiring the tribes to recognize the constitutional rights of non-
Indians? The instant case said that the Colliflower case had no affect on its
decision.
[Vol. 27,
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the non-Indian to deal with the Indian at his peril. This would neither
benefit the Indian nor serve the government's purpose to make the Indians
responsible citizens of this society.
SIDNEY J. STRONG.
CRIMINAL LAW: EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY MAY PREVENT A FAIR TRIAL.-
Defendant, convicted of the first degree murder of his daughter, con-
tended he was denied a fair trial because of inflammatory news coverage
of the crime. Held: Although the news coverage exhibited inflammatory
qualities, it was possible to select an impartial jury because the circu-
lation of the newspaper was limited. Therefore, defendant was not denied
a fair trial. People v. Jacobson, 46 Cal. Rptr. 515, 405 P.2d 555 (1965).
The publicity surrounding a crime raises questions concerning the
accused's right to a trial before an impartial jury. The Sixth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution guarantees the accused in federal
courts the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. The
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to
an impartial jury in state courts.' The guarantee of an impartial jury is
also embodied in the constitutions of thirty nine states and can be im-
plied from the guarantee of trial by jury in the other eleven states.2
Montana is one of the thirty nine states that constitutionally guarantees
an impartial jury.3 The California courts have held that a fair trial re-
quires an impartial jury.4
The news media publicize crimes, investigations, arrests, and trials.
They also publish confessions or the fact of confessions, past criminal
records, and other matter that may be inadmissible at trial. Such pub-
licity may prejudice prospective jurors, destroy the presumption of in-
nocence, subvert the court's control over the admissibility of evidence,
and emphasize certain portions of the evidence. However, the public has
a right to be informed about the aevitity of its servants and institutions.
Publicizing criminal cases may act as a deterrent to further crime, and
it may assist in the solution of crimes. 5 The conflict between these two
'Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965);
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 ,.S. 717 (1961). Whether
the impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that guaranteed by due
process are the same has never been decided by the Supreme Court. It is arguable
that the impartial jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment espouses the more rigid
requirements owing to the federal supervisory control over lower federal courts. See,
Note, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 349 (1960).
'COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND, INDEX DIGEST OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 579 (1959).
'MONT. CONST. art. III, § 16. MONT. CONST. art. III, § 27 provides "No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." State v. Dry-
man, 127 Mont. 579, 269 P.2d 796.
'Ex parte Wallace 24 Cal. 2d 933, 152 P.2d 1 (1944) ; Ex parte Winchester, 53 Cal. 2d
528, 348 P.2d 904, cert. denied 363 U.S. 852 (1960).
'For a general discussion of this area see, SULLIVAN, "TRIAL By NEWSPAPER,"
1966]
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